ABSTRACT
INTRodUCTIoN
TheUNDESAprojectionshowsthattheproportionoftheworld'spopulationlivinginurbanareas willincreasefrom54%(2014)to66%by2050 (UN,2014) .Thus,itisevidentwhycityresiliencehas beenemphasizedgloballyduetocitiesbecomingmorevulnerableasmorepeoplewillbeaffected whenunexpectedeventsoccur.Informationsharingisanimportantwaytoenhanceresilienceina disaster (Palenetal.,2010; Yang&Maxwell,2011) ,withthehelpofinformationandcommunication technology(ICT)toolsthatarebecomingacceptableforfacilitatingcrisiscommunication (Pipek,Liu, &Kerne,2014) .InterpretingfurtherthespiritoftheHyogoFrameworkAction (UNISDR,2005) , theoverallcapabilitytocopewithhazardsisnotsolelyauthorityresponsibility,butisacombination oftheself-organizingcapabilityoftheindividuals,communities,publicandprivateorganizationsin affectedareas.Furthermore,theSendaiFrameworkforDisasterRiskReduction2015-2030outlines the importance of building resilience into policies, plans and programmes. Sendai Framework encouragestheuseofinformationandcommunicationstechnologytoenhancemeasurementtools andthecollection,analysisanddisseminationofdata,aswellastocollaboratewithpeopleatthe locallevelthroughtheinvolvementofbothcommunity-basedandnon-governmentalorganizations.
Inbrief,theroleofICTtoolstoenablethesocietyingeneraltoadaptandrecoverfromhazards andstressesisevident (Trnka&Johansson,2011) ,especiallytoensurethattherightinformation flowssmoothlytotheintendedaudience.
Whatisresilience? UNISDR(2004) definesresilienceas"thecapacityofasystem,community orsocietypotentiallyexposedtohazardstoadapt,byresistingorchanginginordertoreachand maintainanacceptableleveloffunctioningandstructure".Weadoptthisdefinition,andsuggest thatresilienceshouldincludetheabilityofindividualsandcommunitiestoabsorbandprepareto makeuseofthedifferentcrisismanagementcommunicationtechnologies,sothattheycanengage andshareinformationbetterwitheachotherandwithpublicauthorities.Thedefinitionshouldalso includethecapacityforlearningpracticalsecurityandprivacyknowledgeforbetteruseofICT-based engagementtools.
Therecenttrendofubiquitouscomputingallowspeopletoshareinformationbyusingday-todaytechnologiessurroundingthem.Thepresenceofsocialmediaincombinationwiththepowerful trendofcrowdsourcingforobtainingdatasharedbycitizens (Liu,2014; Liza,2011) ,hastosome extentbeenacceptedasapartofcrisiscommunication,apartfromthedataqualityweaknessesthat mayarisefromsocialmediainformation (Tapia&Moore,2014) .Sharinginformationusingvarious meansarguablyimprovesresilienceasindividualscancontributeinformationfastertotheauthorities, aswellastothecircleoffamilyandfriendstheycareaboutandimprovethewayrespondersmanage thecrisis (Lindsay,2011; Trnka&Johansson,2011) .
However,thecrucialquestionsthatshouldbeaddressedare:howthoroughlyaretheprivacy andsecurityconcernsconsideredinlinewiththeencouragementoftheinformationsharingamong differentcomponentsofaresilientsociety?Doesinformationsharingincreasetheresilience,orcould itinsomesituationsweakentheresiliencewhenafocusonsecurityandprivacyemerge?
Informationsecurityconcernsprotectinginformationindifferentcontexts:itsconfidentiality, integrityandavailability (Avižienis,Laprie,Randell,&Landwehr,2004) .Securityofinformationis essentialtosomeorganizationsandactorsbeforetheyarewillingtoshareit (Liu&Chetal,2005) .For privatecitizens,trustconcerningprivacyprotectioniscrucial,coveringpersonalsensitiveinformation (PSI)andpersonallyidentifiableinformation(PII,informationthatcanidentifythem) (Schwartz& Solove,2011 Rogers (2013) suggests the concept of resilience as the organisational and technological resilience.Infact,whenitcomestothetechnologydimensionofresilience,thisaspectisinterpreted as"criticalinfrastructure",andthus,whenthetechnologyislinkedtotheorganisations,itbecomes "amechanismforgoverninginfrastructurefromadistanceandelicitingobedience"-astate-centric one.Suchnotionsexcludethecommunityparticipation.Inprinciple,Rogersadvocatesthecommunity resilienceideaandurgestheshiftfromwarningandinformingtoincreasedpersonalpreparedness andresponsibilityneededinpublicparticipation.Itshouldbere-articulatedinsuchwaythatitdoes notappearasareproductionofpassiveengagemententrenchedinthestate-centricmodel.However, howtechnologycancontributetothisproposedshiftingismissingfromthisproposal.
Another comprehensive review on resilience is conducted by Bhamra, Dani, and Burnard (2011)andManyena(2006) .InBhamra,Dani,andBurnard(2011),whilethefocusisresiliencein organisationallevelcontext,theauthorsareconductingageneralresiliencesurveyintheliterature. Theauthorspointoutthatthegeneraldefinitionofresilienceiscloselyrelatedtothecapabilityand abilityofanelementtoreturntoapre-disturbancestateafteradisruption.Infact,accordingtothe authors,applyingthenotionofresiliencetocommunitiesandthewidercontextoforganisationsdoes notchangethisbroaddefinition. Finally,Bhamraetal.(2011) suggestanumberofareasforadvancing resilience research, in particular: the relationship between human and organisational resilience, understanding interfaces between organisational and infrastructural resilience. Again, the role of technologyispresentedvaguelyas"infrastructuralresilience"withoutsupplementaryexplanation.
In Manyena's work (2006) , the researchers' challenge to achieve consensus on definition of resilienceareaddressed.Resilience,isadmittedlyhavingavarietyinthemeaning.Thevagueness oftheconceptisevenexplicitlymentionedinthisarticle. Manyena(2006) Removing"community"and"engagement"intheSCOPUSsearchresultsinninearticles,but thenthecybersecuritytopicisbecomingprominent.Onlyoneadditionalworkcanbeconsidered relevant (Oh,Agrawal,&Rao,2013) .ThedefinitionofresiliencethatincludesICToftentreatsitas criticalinfrastructure.Thus,theresiliencedefinitioncovershowtoenablesuchsystemstosurvive, and fulfil the resilient principles such as reorganization, absorption, functional redundancy, and physicalredundancy (Jackson,2013) .However,itisalsonotclearifitisapplicabletoICTinterms ofitsusageforcommunityengagement,communityresilienceandcityresilience.Thedefinitionof resiliencefromtheperspectiveofengineering,technologyandICTisofteninflexible,andputastress onthepropertiesofphysicalinfrastructuretocopewiththehazard,andrarelyputinthecontextof society.Toputitdifferently,thelinkbetweentechnologyandcommunityisstillmissing.
Ourworkseekstounderstandwhatpropertiesthatmakecommunityengagementthroughthe useofinformationandcommunicationtechnologyabletocontributetothecommunity'sresilience to disaster. The vagueness of the resilience concept, the lack of consensus on the definition of resilienceandthelackingtechnologicalaspectsinsomeimportantdocumentsencouragingcommunity engagement and collaboration are noticeable. Under those circumstances, we are open to the developmentandchangeofthedefinitionofresiliencesothatitencapsulatesthemeaningwetryto captureandapprehend.AsalsomentionedintheDFIDframework,inonehand,resilienceshould beplacedina"context",andallowacoherentanswertothequestion"resilienceofwhat?".Onthe otherhand,itshouldalsocover"thedisturbance",allowingonetoaddressthequestion (DFID,2011) .
In some literature, city resilience stands on the partnerships and community resilience (Coles & Buckle, 2004; Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008; . They interpret community resilience as community capabilities that buffer it from or support effective response to disasters. Such capabilities include effective risk communications, organizational partnerships, and community engagement to improve, prepare to and respond to disaster. Communication through information sharing and knowledge exchange is one important keysforpartnerships,whicheventuallyistheveryfundamentofcommunityresilience (Ploughetal., 2013; Wellsetal.,2013) ,andsocialmediacanbeonemodeofhowtoachievethat (Dufty,2012) .
Forthisarticle,weprefertheuseofspecifiedresilience"ofwhat",and"towhat"asalsosuggested by (Carpenter,Walker,Anderies,&Abel,2001) 
on Information Sharing, Security and Privacy
Indeed, sharing information is important, but recognizing factors (Yang & Maxwell, 2011) and challenges (Bharosa,Lee,&Janssen,2010 )thatinfluencethesuccessofinformationsharingiseven more crucial. Different studies have mentioned that motivations, approaches and channels affect successfulinformationsharingandindeedthetechnology.AsoftendiscussedintheTechnology AcceptanceModel(TAM),acceptanceoftechnologyisactuallyinfluencedbymanyfactors (Aedo, Díaz, Carroll, Convertino, & Rosson, 2010; Lee, Bharosa, Yang, Janssen, & Rao, 2011; Turner, Kitchenham,Brereton,Charters,&Budgen,2010) ,suchasusefulness,beingeasytouse,trust(in givingpersonalinformation,inthetechnologyitself),subjectivenorms,perceivedinnovativeness, andmanymore.Likewise,acceptanceoftheuseoftechnologyforcommunicationinemergencies andsharingareaffectedbysimilarfactors (Cha,2014) .Notethattrustisactuallyoneofthemain factorsthatinfluencewhetherornotpeoplewillshareinformation.
Atthispoint,theimportanceofsecurityandprivacywillgraduallycomeintotheresilience pictureviathefollowingsequenceofcause-effects:theresilienceofthecityisbuiltuponcommunity resiliencewhichisbasicallytheengagementofindividualcitizensinadisaster.Communityresilience itselfisbuiltuponthewillingnessofindividualsandorganizationstocooperateandshareinformation throughexistingorplannedcommunicationchannelsthatmoreandmorereliesonICTs.Attitude toprivacyisverypersonal (Cottrill&"Vonu"Thakuriah,2015) ,whetherornotanonymitymatters forthem,thussecurityandprivacywillbeimportant.Forsomegroupsofindividualsinthesociety, lackofsecurityandprivacyreducesenthusiasmforsharinginformation.Thechainofweakening reverseeffectswilleventuallydivertthecity'sgoalfromachievingresilience.
Privacyandsecurityoftenappeartogetheralthoughthesetwoconceptsareactuallydifferent. Therearemanydifferentdefinitionsofsecurity,dependingontheproblemdomainandthefocus,and sincesecurityisaverycomplexconcept,itisoftendefinedwithafocusoncertainaspectsofsecurity ratherthanthecompleteabstractconceptofsecurity.However,inthebroadestmostabstractsense, securitycanbedefinedas"thestateofbeingfreefromdangerorthreat"(Oxforddictionaries)or "thestateofbeingprotectedorsafefromharm"(MerriamWebster).Appliedtocomputers,networks and information (Assel, Wesner, & Kipp, 2009) , there are corresponding definitions focused on protectingcomputerhardware,software,networks,andinparticularinformation (Assel,Wesner,& Kipp,2009; Smith,Dinev,&Xu,2011) .Whatinformationprotectionentailsisoftendividedinto3 (the3first)or4differentconcerns;
• Confidentiality:Thatonlyauthorisedpersonnelareabletoaccesstheinformation.
• Integrity:Thatonlyauthorisedpersonnelareabletomodifytheinformation.
• Availability:Authorisedpersonnelareabletoaccesstheinformationwhenneeded.
• Authentication:Verificationoftheidentityofauthorisedpersonnel.
Privacyisanimportantrelatedconcernwhichisequallyacomplexissue (Bélanger&Crossler, 2011) .Itincludestheabilitytokeeppersonalsensitiveinformationconfidentialandtocontrolthe disseminationofpersonalinformationingeneral,aswellas"therighttobeletalone"andpersonal autonomy.IntheInternetage,therearenewchallengestoprivacyintheformofprotectionofonline information (Cavoukian,Taylor,&Abrams,2010) ,trustingthethird-partystorageproviders (Galiero &Giammatteo,2009) ,andaccountableprivacysupportingservices (Camenisch,Groß,&Heydt-Benjamin,2009 ).Themethodsusedforonlineprivacyprotectionareoftensimilartooridenticalto themethodsusedininformationsecurity,suchascryptographicallyprotectedcommunicationand informationstorage (Bharosa,Janssen,&Tan,2011; Hildebrandt,2013) ,andprivacyandsecurity shouldexistby-design (Camenischetal.,2009; Chik,2013; Cottrill&"Vonu"Thakuriah,2015; Galiero&Giammatteo,2009; Hong&Landay,2004; Lederer,Hong,Dey,&Landay,2004; Parrish, 2010) .
Measuringsecurityandprivacyisnoteasy.Alotofmetricshavebeenproposed (Stolfo,Bellovin, &Evans,2011) ,butmanyofthemarenoteasilyusedbynon-securityexperts.PekárekandPötzsch (2009)andHull,Lipford,andLatulipe(2011)addressestheprivacyissuesincollaborativeworkspaces andsocialnetworks,whichalsocanbeincludingtheconsentdilemma (Solove,2012 
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Scope
To clarify the focus areas of our research, we suggest metrics to assess security and quality of engagement tools that are useful for people with limited computer security background and no accesstosysteminternals.Inotherwords,asetofmetricsthatareintendedtobeeasytousee.g.for researchersandpractitionersinEmergencyManagement.Finally,intheoutcomeofthisstudy,wewill discussthepropertiesofthreedifferentusergroupsregardingthewillingnesstoshareinformation inadisaster.Fromthispointofview,wewillthendiscussqualitativelyhowthesepropertiesaffect resiliencewithexamplesorscenarios.
Research Questions
Thecentralresearchquestions (RQs) ThesethreegroupsofuserswillbecentraltodiscussRQ3-ifprivacyandsecuritystrengthen orweakenresilience(section5).
Procedures
Toimplementthemethodologydescribedearlier,weconductthefollowingprocedures:
Stage 1-Metrics.Therearemanycriteriathatcouldbeusedtoevaluatethesecurityofthesystems inquestion,amongothers:
• Security by Design/Built-In Security:Thisisacommoncriteriaforevaluationofsecurity (Fernandez,2004 Severalofthesecriteriaarevagueandhardtogiveabinaryscore,andsomerequireinsider information.And,notallsecurityrequirementscanbetested (Pfleeger,2012) .Therefore,wehave madeaselectionoftheprivacyandsecuritycriteriaandconcretizedthemintotheteststhatcan beseenintheTable3.ThedefinitionsandapplicationsofthesemetricsareprovidedinSection4.
Stage 2-Tools.Whichtoolsarepreferredtousecanalsovaryfromcountrytocountry,andfromhazard tohazard.AwiderangeofICTtools,andtechnologieshasbeenproposedandused,ranging fromWikis,Smartphoneapps,socialmedia(especiallyFacebook,YouTubeandTwitter),and otheronlineengagementandreal-timecommunitymappingtools.
UshahidiorGoogleCrisisResponseareexamplesoftoolsforcommunitymapping.Someof theseICT-basedtoolssupportcrowdsourcing.Indifferentcountries,smartphoneappsforemergencies havebeenwidelyusedascommunicationtoolsbythegovernmentsuchasFEMAApp,Hurricane WedonotelaboratefurtherStage3asitisquiteclearlydescribedintheMethodologySection. notes: 1) Allows e.g. "123" which is a very weak password.; 2) Link present, but no text.; 3) Test user activation pending; 4) Activated LinkedIn group membership; 4) Via Terms of Use; 5) No information if photo upload is secure; 6) No personal identifiable information (PII) sent; 6) Only available in USA.; 7) Only for making phone calls; 8) Only available in Australia; 9) https://beinglgbtinasia.crowdmap.com;10)Deployment in Sweden http://www.diskrimineringskartan.se; 11) Depends on deployment. No PII sent by default.; 12) Deployed when needed; 13) Depends on deployment; 14) For deployment managers, not for end-users; 15) Anonymous allowed; 16) Deployed as needed; 17) Basic warning info only. 18) Activated when/where needed; 19) Call from skype to phone is not encrypted across the phone network. mediausersandactivehelpers)toshareinformationduringacrisisbasedoneachgroup'spreference on required security and privacy strength. A city is used as exemplary case in our analysis. Our discussionwillfocusonthreepoints:1)Situationsthatwillstrengthenorweakentheresilience,based onusergroupperspectives;2)Thepredictedpreferabletoolsofeachgroup;and3)Theinformation flowmodelbasedonthetestedtoolslinkedtothepredictedneedforsecurityandprivacy,anduser groupcategoriesthataresuitedforeachinformationflowmodel. Table6depictstheproposedframeworktoanalysethewillingnesstoshareinformationgiven differentprivacyandsecuritystrengthintheengagementtools.Therowsrepresenttheusergroups. Thecolumnscapturethestrengthcategoriesofsecurityandprivacyembeddedinthesharingtools i.e."Noprivacy/security","Averageprivacy/security"and"Strongprivacy/security/anonymity". The light grey area on the right side represents the optimal smooth information flow to the city stakeholders,whenthepreferableprivacyofusersmatchestheprovidedinformationsharingtools. 
RESULTS ANd ANALySIS
CoNCLUSIoN
In this article, we have proposed security and privacy metrics, and intuitive-based user group classificationswithrespecttotheinformationandcommunicationengagementtools.Weconclude thattherequirementforprivacyand/oranonymitydependsontheintendedcommunicationtarget, andthisvariesbetweenthedifferentusergroups,andonthepotentialriskassociatedwithabreach ofprivacy.Theinsightsfromthediscussioninthispaperisthatweshouldmitigatereluctancesofthe whistle-blowertouseanytypesofcommunityengagementandinformationsharing.Forawhistleblowerthatsometimescarryurgentinformation,theriskisveryhighthathewillbeinmajortrouble ifhisprivacyisviolated.Wealsoshouldnotslowdowntheactivehelpersbymakingthetooltoo complex-e.g.throughexcessivesecurity,althoughforanactivehelper,thatriskismorelikeaminor annoyance.Boththesegroupsusuallywanttospreadtheinformationaswideasneededtoreachthe properauthorities.Ontheotherhand,socialmediauserstendtotargetfriendsandfamilyandmay forexampleeitherwanttotellthattheyaresafe,orinformaboutlocalrisks.Thisinformationmay stillbeofusetothecrisishandlersifitisavailabletothepublic,butreasonableprivacysettingsmay alsopreventthistohappen.
Thus,thepolicymakersorlocalauthorityinthecityshouldbewillingtoconsiderallrelevant typesofusergroupsinthesocietybasedontheirpreferredprivacyandsecurityrequirements,and allow different user groups to participate through different tools, including representative tools fromthoseclassesoftoolsmentionedinTable6.Leavingoutwhistle-blowersorslowingdownand annoyingactivehelperswouldimpaircitizenengagementandultimatelyresilience.Tobeabletoget acompletepicturefrominformationsharedbycitizens,wesuggestthatbothaspecialisedtoolwith simpleverified-usermessagesaswellasopeningformoderatedanonymousmessages-andrelevant socialnetworks,shouldbeutilized.
Finally, we also need to cover some limitations of our work: 1) We assume that evaluators ofthesecurityandprivacyleveloftheengagementtoolshavealimitedexpertiseonsecuritybut shouldknowtheminimumrequirementstodeterminewhetherornotsuchcriteriaarefulfilledor covered.2)Themethodsforevaluatingsecurityandprivacyoftheengagementtoolsarenotfrom theinsiderperspectivebutfromwhatinformationhasbeenmadeavailableforpublicorisexternally observable.3)Thesuggestedmetricsareonlyaninitialproposal.Thesecurityandprivacymetrics thatarerelevantforcitystakeholderscanbeelaboratedfurtherindifferentstagesoftheresilience cycle:preparedness,response,recoveryandmitigation.Likewise,thematrixfortheusergroupscan beelaboratedfurthertoincludee.g.engagementtoolsforhelpingindividualsthatareaffectedbythe disasters,wherethesecurityandprivacywillbeextremelyimportant.Forexample,theengagement toolswillincludecounsellingfortrauma,shocksorotherpsychologicalorpsychosocialproblems, orotherissuesthatarenotidentifiedhere.4)Tobeawarethatthestrongprivacyoranonymitythat allows whistle-blowers to feel comfortable enough to submit their information, can also be used foractorswithbadintentions,formisleadingofevenattemptingtotraprescuepersonnel,orfor submittingbombthreatsandothercriminalmessages.5)Ourexperiment,especiallytheevaluation oftheavailabilitymetricisbasedonlimitedobservationtime,andnote.g.throughmonitoringover longerperiod,wherethenwecouldclaime.g."uptimeof99%".
Therearemanydirectionsthatcouldbeinvestigatedfurtherbasedonthisstudy,butitshould stillbeabletostandonitsownasasetofguidelinesforthesecurityandprivacyaspectsofselecting toolsforengagingcitizensincreatingaresilientsociety. (2017) (2018) (2019) , and a senior researcher I H2020 project Smart-Mature Resilience on disaster resilience (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) 
